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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLEN L. NICEWINTER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
DAVID H. NICEWINTER and

Case No. 7669

GENEVA C. NICEWINTER,
fJefendants and Appellants.

MARIE M. DIENER,
Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts in
appellants' brief in so far as they are set forth from
the record. However, this controversy ~arises out of the
interpretation of a joint venture agreement between two
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brothers, but in appellants' Statement no facts are set
forth concerning the inducement which pursuaded plaintiff to join defendant in his apartment house venture
and nothing is set forth as to the terms and provisions
of their agreement except these meagre words:
''An understanding was reached as a result
of these discussions on or about the 23rd day of
February, 1948."
Since this appeal grows out of the provisions of
that understanding as interpreted by Judge Ellett and
the enforcement responsibilities thereof as interpreted
by Judge Van Cott, we believe that a more amplified
statement of its primary provisions would be helpful,
and believe these two provisions are fundamental, to
wit:
It is agreed between plaintiff Glen L. Nicewinter and defendant David H. Nicewinter that
all money and the value of the property supplied
by plaintiff would be repaid to him and that he
would not lose anything.
It was also understood between said brothers
that the said property should be sold to the best
advantage and thereupon an accounting should
be made between them in accordance with the
foregoing terms of their agreement (R. 7 and
8, par. 8-9).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Respondent will answer and argue the nine points
posed by the appellants in the order set forth and argued
in appellants' brief. The first three of these points are
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grouped and argued together (although in their argument they are presented in ~a different order: 2, 3, 1),
and points No. -! and 5 are also grouped and argued
together. Respondent will ansvver and argue said points
in the same order they are presented as p·oints in argument and the saine gToupings ~a.s adopted by appellants.
In addition, respondent contends that this appeal
is abortive in that it is concerned with an interlocutory
decree which contemplates and provides for a subsequent and final judgment.
POINTS NO's 1, 2 AND 3
Following appellants' example, respondent groups
these three points in the order argued by appellants:
ARGUMENT
POINTS NO's 2, 3 AND 1
App·ellants' argument is presented in sequence of
Point 2, Point 3, and Point 1, being concerned in that
sequence with Judge Van Cott's Findings of F.act, Conclusions of Law, and Decree, respectively. Therefore,
for ready comparison, we feel constrained to follow the
same order:
POINT NO. 2
(re: Findings of Fact)
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
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11 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 23), THE SAME BEING
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE .

. The text of paragraph 11, R. 23, follows:
' '11. That said decree further provided that
plaintiff should be repaid all monies and property
which he has put into said enterprise in the event
there was not enough to repay both of them for
all their ,contributions thereto, and said monies
and property to be repaid has been determined
by Decree of this court to be adjudicated to be
a sum of $8,000.00 to be repaid in the event there
was not even enough to repay both of them for
all their contributions thereto.''
Answering, we submit excerpts from the text of
Judge Ellett's D·ecree and Findings and Conclusions:
''It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that so
far as p·ossible there shall be repaid to Glen L. Nicewinter ~all monies and property which he has put into
said enterprise in the event there is not enough to repay
said venturers for all their contributions." (R. 5).
'' 8. It was also agreed between plaintiff Glen L.
Nicewinter and defendant David H. Nicewinter that
all money and the value of the property supplied by
plaintiff would be repaid to him and that he would not
lose anything" (R. 7).

"6. That the plaintiff did pay into said firm in
cash and the purchase of materials the sum of $8,000.00
* * * " (R. 7) .
''That defendant David H. Nicewinter further agreed
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that plaintiff would not lose any of the money which
he contributed to said joint venture***" (R. 8).
Respondent subn1its that the said quotations from
R. 5, R. 7, and R. 8 amply sup.port Judge Van Cott's
Findings of Fact concerned in Point 2, if only Judge
Van Cott's reference to Judge Ellett's "Decree" is
construed liberally and according to its obvious intent
to embrace Judg~e Ellett's ''Findings" and "Conclusions.''
At the trial the appellants were hoth present in
person and represented by counsel and it was their
burden to proceed with an attack upon plaintiff's prima
facie showing \Yhich they had admitted by paragraph
1 of their ansvver (R. 10). This express admission ·obviated the necessity of plaintiff proving these faets "as
a solemn ~admission by the adverse party is the highest
form of proof.'' Gatrell vs. Salt Lake Oownty (106 Utah
409, 149 P (2nd) 827).

POINT NO.3
(re: Conclusion of Law)
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
1 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 23), THE SAME
BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR
THE EVIDENCE.

The text of par. 1, R. 23 follows:
''That all interest of Glen L. Nice winter and
David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
in and to the hereinafter described real property
together with the contract for the purchase thereof from Marie M. Diener should be sold to the
highest bidder of the said Glen L. Nicewinter and
David H. Nicewinter in ,open court f.or cash and
that the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due to the
said Glen L. Nicewinter may be app~lied as cash
in the bidding at said sale, and***"
Except for the limitation as to bidders, all of this
text is sustained by Judge VanCott's Findings of Fact,
and the new element of limiting the bidders to the
brothers is sustained by respondent's stipulation (R.
20) "that the above entitled court by said judge may sell
said property and all interest therein to the highest
bidder as between plaintiff Glen L. Nicewinter and
David H. Nicewinter as defendant.''
POINT NO. 1 ( re: Decree)
,•

APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ,PARAGRAPH
1 OF THE DECREE (R. 30, 31), THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Text of paragraph 1 ·of the Decree (R. 30, 31)
follows:
''IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that all interest of Glen L. Nicewinter and David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C.
Nicewinter in and to the real property located
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described
hereinafter be sold to the highest bidder as between the said Glen L. Nicewinter and David
H. Nicewinter in open court for cash, and that
the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due to the said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Glen L. Nice,vinter as adjudged by this court by
Decree dated the 28th day of April, 1950, may
be applied by him as cash in bidding at said sale,
and***"
Judge Van Cot,t's Decree follows logically out ·Of his
Conclusions above and it is thus amply supported.
The above quotations from Judge Ellett's Judgment,
including his Finding·s and Conclusions, were all admitted
by appellants (R. 10) and, taken 1a.s a group, amply sustain Judge Van Cott's Decree ~of Sale. Respondent
admits that the use of the words "as adjudged by this
court by Decree'' in Judge VanCott's Decree and Findings above are used loosely to embrace Judge Ellett's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but submits
that the objection is only technical, does not overcome
the result that the facts were found in judicial process
and admit~ted (R. 10) by appellants. Judge Ellett's
Findings and Decree 1a.re no~· now before this court
for review, and, for the purposes :of this appeal from
Judge VanCott's order of sale, the Judgment (Findings,
Conclusions and Decree) of Judge Ellett is conclusive.
Appellants go wholly outside of ~the record in dragging in an assertion that appellant D1a.vid H. Nicewinter
has an investment in excess of $12,000.00. The record
indicates that appellant has paid in but $2,500.00 (R. 19),
but it is admitted that respondent has paid in $8,000.00
(R. 7, R. 10). Other than those investments the record
indicates that their contributions are equal (R. 8).
Under these circums1tances it would be "unjustly
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advantageous" (Ap. Bf. p. 11) to appellants to deprive
respondent of the benefits of his bargain (R. 7, par. 8).
Appellants find in the stipulation (R. 20) no justification for making available to respondent the $8,000.00
credit. We rely upon the findings of Judge Ellett for
the $8,000.00 credit, not upon the stipulation. We do rely
on the stipulation to answer any objections to the sale
which Geneva C. Nicewinter might have by reason of a
statutory interest or otherwise. Answering the objection
that the stipulation was not executed by the parties
but by counsel it must be presumed that their counsel
acted only after consultation and approval of their
·clients; especially in view of the record (R. 33, 34),
wherein the objections filed made no attempt to repudiate
or disavow the stipulation.
The doubt raised by counsel as to whether the stipulation refers to ~the same contract as that introduced in
evidence is captious. It has the same date, the s'ame
seller, the same purchaser David H. Nicewinter and the
substitution of Glen L. Nicewinter for Geneva C. Nicewinter by mutual agreement indicates that the parties
litigant conceded that by the proceedings before Judge
Ellett, Geneva's interest in said contract was only nominal but that Glen's interest therein had been established
as incident to the establishment of his admitted one-half
intereS't in the said joint venture with David.
Equally ·captious is the ·objection that Marie M.
Diener is not a party to the stipulation. That ''she most
certainly has a direct interest in the proceedings'' was
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manifest by her p·resence in court and her testimony at
the time set for the sale (R. 44-49). Her right to have
paid to her the balance of $2,900.00 and interest owing
her for her vendor's ti1tle in said real property has never
been questioned and all rights of the other par~ties litigant are recognized as subject to her first claim which she
has set forth in a letter and statement of account (R.
17, 18).
C,ont:rrary to appellants' alleg~ation that Geneva C.
Nicewinter and Niarie M. Diener's interests have been
ignored it appears that respondent has gone out of his
'\vay to see that their interests are given every consideration. The sale of the property was subject to Mrs.
Diener's interest (R. 31), and is ,only an intermediate
step in process of a final settlement and when the case
is finally determined the interest of Geneva C. Nicewinter, assuming she has such any interest, and the
interest of 1farie M. Diener will be fully protected.

P,OINT NO.4
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
2 OF THE DECREE (R. 31), THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS O,F FACT OR THE EVIDENCE.

POINT NO.5
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
4 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 24), THE SAME
BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR
THE EVIDENCE.
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We present and argue these points as a group as
did appellants.
In No.4 the appellants cl,aim as unsupported by the
Findings of Fact or the evidence the following paragraph
2 of the Decree ( R. 31) :
''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that said sale shall be conducted
in the courtroom of Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., at
9:15 o'clock A.M. on Friday, the 9th day of March,
1951, and that notice of said sale shall be given
by serving upon the said Franklin Dunn Richards,
attorney, a notice thereof at least five days prior
to said sale, and that rthe property and premises
herein referred to are described as :
Commencing at ,a point 2 rds. North of the
Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, Plat ''A'',
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North
4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ; thence South 4 rds.;
thence West 10 rds. to the place of beginning,
subject to and together with a -contract dated
September 25, 1947, with Marie M. Diener, seller,
and together with all furniture, furnishings and
~appliances appertaining to said joint venture
premises, and. ''
In No. 5 appellants claim as unsupp.orted by the
Findings of Fact or the evidence paragraph~ of the Conclusions ·of Law (R. 23, 24), which follows:
''That the properrty and premises herein referred to are located in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and particularly described as :
Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of the
Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, Plat ''A'',
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Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North
4 rds.; thence East 10 rds.; thence South 4 rds.;
thence West 10 rds. to the place of beginning,
subject to and ,together with a contract dated
September 25, 1947, 'vi th ~Iarie M. Diener, seller,
and together 'vith all furniture, furnishings and
appliances appertaining to said joint venture
premises.' '

Not,vi thstanding the "\Vords ''furniture, furnishings
and appliances" do not appear in the previous pleadings
they were always contemplated as incident to, and embraced within, the property of the joint venture. This
is substantiated by (1) rthe stipulation (R. 20), and (2)
the fact that this order of sale is an interlocutory proceeding looking to a final adjudication between the
parties pending 'vhich the proceeds of sale of their joint
venture interests are to remain in _the custody of the
clerk.
That the joint venture here involves not merely the
real property but the personal }ltroperty 1thereunto appertaining has never before been questioned. Even at
the time the defendants threw all objections they could
think of at the proposed decree of Judge VanCott, it did
not even enter their minds to object to the use of these
words, ''sale of the furniture, furnishings and appliances
appertaining to said joint venture premises" (See R.
33, 34).
The stipulation of sale concerns "property at 725733 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah" and the contract incident thereto, and recites that said court ''shall
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sell said property and all interest therein" (R. 20),
under which inclusive w,ords may reasonably be included
all furniture, furnishings and appliances appertaining to
the joint venture premises.
If it were claimed that "property at 725-733 South
2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah" was not the res of the
joint venture, it is unthinkable that appellants would
have neglected to offer that as a specific objection among
their list of objections (R. 33, 34).
At any rate, in the execution of this interlocutory
decree wherein the proceeds of sale are deposited with
the clerk, the rights of appellants are adequately safeguarded. Yes, even the res is preserved, because one
of the parties litigant will be the buyer and will continue under the cour1t 's jurisdiction until final decree.
Appellants cannot be prejudiced.
POINT NO.6
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
5 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Text of paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact (R. 22):

"5. That said property is being purchased
from defendant Marie M. Diener and that defendant Geneva C. Nicewinter is the wife of David
H. Nicewinter and has some statutory interest in
defendant David H. Nicewinter 's interest therein.''
Counsel presumes that "~as a result of the written
contract, Exhibit 'A' (R. 19) she (Geneva C. Nicewinter)
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had a one-half interest in the real property.'' That
might haYe been presumed until proved otherwise.
Judge Ellett's Decree reciting that Glen and David have
a joint venture in said property 1and that the profits and
increase of value shall be divided share and share alike
upon sale thereof, and that each of said brothers and his
wife shall have reasonable living quarters out of said
premises pending sale thereof" (R. 4, 5) sufficiently,
and for the purpose of this action conclusively, overcomes
the p·resumption that Geneva had a one-half interest
in ~he real property, as claimed, or that her rights were
totally ignored.

POINT NO.7
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
7 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Text of parag·:vaph 7 of the Findings of Fact (R.
22) follows :
"7. This ·court further found that each of
said brothers and his wife shall have reasonable
living quarters out of said premises pending sale
thereof and further ordered that within a reasonable time said premises shall be sold to rthe best
advantage and thereupon an accounting shall be
made between them in accordance with the terms
of this order, and"
Appellants are correct in saying that they denied in
paragraph 2 of the answer (R. 10) plaintiff's allegation
that the parties ''shall have reasonable living quarters
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out of said premises pending the sale thereof.'' However, in paragraph 1 of their answer (R. 10) appellants
did concede :
"7. that it was also ~agreed between plaintiff Glen
L. Nicewinter and defendant David H. Nicewinter that
each of them would have a reasonable living out of said
premises for himself and his wife and that e1ach did so
receive his living and board rtherefrom" (R. 7). But the
winner of the argument as to point No. 7 would have only
a pyrrhic victory inasmuch as the Decree (R. 30, 31) is
entirely silent with respect to the subject matter of this
point, nothing is claimed therefore, it is the basis of no
order, and appellants are in no wise prejudiced.

POINT NO.8
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
8 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact (R. 22) follows:
"8. That a reasonable time has now expired
but said premises have not been sold.''
Again appellants 'are correct in their statement
that the allegrution of the complaint concerning this subject rna tter is denied by his answer.
The only purpose for such a Finding of Fact would
be to lay a foundation for the order of s1ale of the apartment house property, but in view of appellants' stipulation for sale (R. 20) such a Finding is entirely superSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fluous and the Decree (R. 30) is amply sustained without reference to, or support from, said Finding.

In Yie\Y of appellants' pl'layer (R. 11), ''for a judgment of this court terminating and dissolving the joint
venture" and that "the subject of the venture be placed
on the market for sale" it \Yas entirely unnecessary to
support by evidence the proposition that a re,a.sonable
time had exp.ired. Nor can appellants be prejudicej by
the allegation that ''said premises have not been sold.''
If they had been sold we \Yould not be up here ... at
least not until af1ter an accounting-a final decree-which
must hereafter be adjudicated by the trial court.
POINT NO.9
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH
9 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact (R. 23) follows:
''9. That defendant David H. Nicewinter received approximately $400.00 per month gross
rentals from said premises, for which he has made
no accounting to plaintiff, notwithstanding plaintiff's demand therefore and notwithstanding that
said business is a joint venture."
Proof of plaintiff's having demanded 1a.n accounting appears in the record (R. 36, 37). Proof of a joint
venture appears in R. 7, par. 4. Proof that plaintiff was
entitled to an 'accounting is found in Judge Ellett's FindSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1ngs and Decree (R. 4, 8) admitted by appellants (R.
10).
As to the $400.00 a month we allow that at this time
we would have no more right to submit the ''For Sale''
advertisements published at 'a:ppellants' ins1tance ·concerning the income from said premises than he has to
allege, -vvithout any support, that appellant has made a
$1~000 investment.
For our opponent to )argue that rthis finding fails of
support is one thing; but he goes far beyond, saying:
''such finding ... we are advised is contrary to the facts''
(Ap. Bf. p. 19). This last statement questions the integrity, no1t merely the support, of the finding and suggests that in fairness we be allowed to offer on this
hearing on appeal, some tell-tale news clippings sponsored by appellants.
But even if the court cannot take judicial knowledge that nine apartments rut 725-733 South 2nd East in
Salt Lake City would bring ''approximately $400.00 per
month gross,'' and even if there were no support whatsoever for this finding, it is not fatal to the interlocutory
order of sale here appealed from.
The Conclusions of Law do not rely on this finding,
no order results therefrom, nor is followed into the decree, and as a result appellants are in no wise prejudiced,
and in further proceedings which are provided for after
the sale they will have ample opportunity to traverse.
Our op.ponent acknowledges that ·the decree "contemplates an ultimate accounting between these parties"
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(Ap. Bf. 19), thus conceding its interlocutory ·character
and its amenability to n1odification upon proof to be
given before final deeree. Salt Lake ·City vs. Industrial
Co1nmission, 82 U. 179, 22 P. 2nd 1046.
RESPONDENT'S POINT NO. 1
JUDGE VAN COTT'S DECREE (R. 30, 31) HERE APPEALED FROM IS AN INTERLOCUTORY O·RDER OR DECISION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 72 (b) OF UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Our rules of civil procedure provide for an 'appeal
to the Supreme Court (a) from all final judgments, and
(b) from Interlocutory ·Orders or Decisions. Respondent
contends that the order of Judge Van Cott which appellants seek now to have reversed is an interlocutory
order or decree.
''Interlocutory orders or decrees are defined by
Blackstone as 'such as are given in the middle of a case,
in some plea, proceeding or default which is only intermediate and does not finally determine or complete the
suit."' Hirsch Co. vs. Scott, 100 So. 157, 158; 87 Fla.
336.
Now let's look at Judge VanCott's decree: Firstly
it orders a sale. It describes the res to be sold. It refers
to the incident real estate ·contract of vendor Diener of
said· real rp·roperty, makes the sale of the real property
subj_ect to said contract, and restricts the res to the interes1ts therein of the contestants herein, it fixes the time and
place of sale, provides the manner of notice, provides that
respondent may use in bidding a cash ·credit previously
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found o\ving him by another division of the same court,
accedes to a written stipulation of all contesting litigants
limiting 1the bidding to two persons: The p arty responsible for said debt, and the party who is entitled thereto;
·provides that possession be given the successful bidder
within a specified time. Finally this decree provides that,
having ·complied with all the terms neXJt above ordered
concerning said sale, the proceedings are nevertheless
not final: They are only intermediate; and 1all the provisions concerning said sale do not finally determine or
complete the suit, in these final words: "the proceeds
from said sale shall be deposited with the clerk of ~this
court for disposition in accordance with an account to
be subsequently adjudicated herein." (R. 31)
1

The decree now under review is essenti~ally just an
intermediate order of sale incident to, and precedent to a
final adjudication winding up a joil1lt venture. It clearly ..
comes within the Blackstone definition of an interlocutory order or decree.
CONCLUSION
This interlocutory decree amply protects the interests of all persons involved either directly or indirectly
specifying that all proceeds from said sale shall be
deposited with the clerk of the Court for disposition
in accordance with an account to be subsequently adjudicated herein and limiting the property to be sold
to contestants who remain under the court's jurisdiction.
Paramount policy of law is to permit litigants to
obtain review of rules of trial courts, but there is also
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the rule that cases shall not be appealed piecemeal or
in installments, and what constitutes final judgment
'vill be determined by a ppliCaJtion of these two rules .
.Attorney General vs. Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P. 2nd
1277, 114 A.L.R. 726.
While it is true that a final judgment is not made
by the constitution a condition ·precedent to the jurisdi-ction of the Supreme Courtt to entertain an appeal,
nevertheless it is a condition precedent, except in rare
instances, to entertaining the appeal because of the
ancient policy of the law based on sound principles
(modifying North Point ,Consol. Irrig. Co. vs. Utah ~
Salt Lake Carnal Co., 14 Urtah, 155, 46 P. 824, 826).
Appellants are appealing from an interlocutory
order without ever having complied with conditions
precedent, that is, to serve upon the adverse party,
and file in the Supreme Court, a il'etition to graDJt an
appeal ''setting forth the order compLained of and the
grounds and reasons for an appeal before final judgment" as required by Rule 72(b) of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
No order having ever been issued authorizing this
appeal res;p·ondent moves that it be dismissed.
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